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MORTGAGE BANKS
A STUDY

IN REAL ESTATE FINANCE

N the beginning of our history, when America was in the

main a land of farms, forests and fishermen, it was said
by a wise man that a penny saved is a penny earned. It took
a century and a half for this truth to become imbedded in
the conscience of the millions who subsequently came to these
shores and no sooner had it become a daily precept and a
fundamental truth in the lives of most of us, when at last we
discovered that in many instances it was no longer the whole
truth and that the ancient adage must be rewritten to meet
a new order of things. Savings long accumulated through
difficult forbearance and painstaking surrender of present
joys have disappeared into thin air and have shattered
pillars of reliance into blasted hopes.
Two years of experience in salvaging real estate investments have taught the tragic lesson that at least in this field
the hope of realization is at best a long deferred one to the
investor." Legal procedure developed in another age when
problems were simpler and economic forces let loose by conditions undreamed of, have combined to render almost futile
any effort to convert frozen security into liquid assets. One
naturally looks about for the causes of things-but the frank
avowal must be made that to some degree what has happened was inevitable. This avowal, however, must not be
taken to mean, and cannot be conceded to justify the conclusion that all that went before must necessarily recur
with the same degree of destructive and painful consequence.
Much can be avoided by careful planning. Much can be done
by the educative process and the slow infiltration of the
'This is particularly true in jurisdictions which have adopted mortgage

moratoria, under which various devices are utilized to postpone the payment of
mortgage debts. In New York State, for instance, the certificate holders in
mortgages under the jurisdiction of the Mortgage Commission between May 15,
1935 and September 1, 1937, having an average principal amount for the period
of $450,000,000, received payments of principal of $32,233,377.68, of which more
than $7,000,000 may fairly be said to be the result of special circumstances.
The payment on principal of these mortgages has been, therefore, between
5% and 6%. Effective moratoria exist in nine states.
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truths of finance in the minds of the investors. More can be
done by careful and scientific governmental husbandry of the
resources of the great body of the American saving public.
Almost forty per centum of the national wealth consists
of land values.2 To an enormous extent the people's
savings have financed investments in real property.3 The
funds have been derived in the main from investments
made by financial institutions, like banks and insurance
companies, who draw their assets from the people generally, and, to a large extent, more directly from investors
who have bought mortgages, mortgage bonds, or certificates. 4
The devices are simple ones. A mortgage company will lend
money to an owner and take as security his bond secured by
a mortgage on real property. It will then either sell its own
bonds to the public, secured by the mortgage which will be
placed in the hands of a trustee for the bondholders, or it
will sell part interests in the mortgage, generally called certificates, which are sometimes guaranteed and sometimes unguaranteed by the vendor. In this way many billions of
dollars of mortgage bonds and certificates have been sold
throughout the United States. In 1933 guaranteed certifi'DOANE, MEASUREMENT OF AMERICAN WEALTH (1933) estimates that in
1932 land worth 112.4 billions of dollars constituted 30% of the national
wealth; buildings on that land worth 37 billions of dollars constituted 9.9%
more.

3 The private mortgage debt for the year 1932 in the United States has
been estimated at 58.4 billions of dollars. DOANE, op. cit. surpra.
'A writer in the Quarterly Journal of Economics, in November, 1930, page

104, estimated that in 1929 urban real estate mortgages in the United States
were distributed as follows (in millions of dollars) :
Commercial banks .................................................
5,195
M utual savings banks ..........................................
5,125
Life insurance companies ...................................
4,831
Building and loan associations ..........................
7,787
M ortgage bonds .....................................................

4,168.9

T otal..............................................................
27,106.9
The United States Department of Commerce indicates that in 1934 mortgage debts were distributed as follows:
Farm mortgages ........................... 7.8 billions of dollars,
10.4% of national debt.
Non-farm home mortgages ...... 17.7 billions of dollars,

23.7% of national debt.
Other urban mortgages ............ 12.7 billions of dollars,
17% of national debt.
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cates alone in New York State were slightly less than one
billion dollars.5 Almost another billion dollars of uncertificated whole mortgages, also guaranteed, were likewise distributed to the public through these means. 6 Mortgage bonds
to the extent of billions of dollars were distributed by bond
houses and real estate mortgage concerns.
During the year 1933 nearly all of these bonds and certificates were in default.7 The history of this default is now
a familiar one, and the efforts of the State of New York, as
well as all other states, to deal with the situation, to salvage,
to reorganize and to liquidate are now part of a well known
record.
'According to the report of George W. Alger, Moreland Act Commissioner
appointed by Governor Lehman, in 1934 guaranties of mortgage certificates by
companies under the jurisdiction of the Insurance Department totalled on

December 31, 1933, $837,819,598.43.
The report of the Joint Legislative Committee on banks, investment trusts
and mortgages (LEG. Doc. 1935, No. 57) states that Prudence Company, Inc.
guaranteed $51,000,000 in mortgage certificates. This company was organized
under the Banking Law and its guaranties are not included within Commissioner
Alger's computations.
" Commissioner Alger states that as of December 31, 1933, mortgages
guaranteed by companies under the jurisdiction of the Insurance Department
totalled $972,311,706.46. The report of the Joint Legislative Committee, see
note 5, .supa, states that Prudence Company, Inc. guaranteed whole mortgages
in the amount of $56,000,000.
In all, the total guaranties outstanding on December 31, 1933, were
$1,887,472,875.14, which did not include mortgages on which the guarantying
company's agency had been terminated but the guaranty not released. The
guaranteed mortgages affected by a termination of agency between December
31, 1932 and June 30, 1934 aggregated $979,689,404.03, and between December
31, 1932 and December 31, 1933, $903,730,701.54. On this last date the total
outstanding guaranties were $2,791,203,576.68.
'As respects the mortgages guaranteed by companies under the jurisdiction
of the Insurance Department, Commissioner Alger in his report (Appendices
II, III and IV) gives the status of defaults as follows:
Outstanding Guaranties
No. of Mtges. Principal Amount
W hole Mortgages ...................................
121.063
$972,311,706.46
Specific Series .........................................
8,535
664,375,244.90
Group Series ............................................
11.428
173,444,353.53
Total ...............................................
141,026
$1,810,131,304.89
Defaults
No. of Mtges. Prin. Amt.
Amt. of Defaults
Whole Mortgages ........ 41,515
$451,828,836.96
$30,293,261.60
Specific Series .............. 4,885
494,784,380.47
25,524,290.06
Group Series .................
6,562
142,200,987.65
11,129,977.34
Total ....................

52,962

$1,088,814,205.08

$66,947,529.00
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We look back at the events that led up to these defaults
in the light of our experience in dealing with them and we
discover certain basic truths. In the first place, there was
practically no governmental regulation of the business. Any
one with small capital, and a mind to do so, could go into
the business of lending money secured by mortgages on
real property and distribute the burden among investors.8
Secondly, appraisals of real property were made in a manner
that suggests, in many cases, reckless disregard of the relations between the income producing possibilities of real property and the other elements that go to make up concepts of
market value.9 Thirdly, the mortgages were nearly all
short term mortgages, from three to five years. There was
never any expectation that these mortgages would be
paid off. On the contrary, it was fairly certain that the
owner would not be in a position to pay off the principal
amount on the due date. It was expected that he would
either negotiate for a renewal of the loan for a further period
of three to five years or perhaps borrow money from some
' The present law permits the formation of corporations under the Stock
Corporation Law for the purpose of "loaning money in this state on bonds,
notes or other evidences of indebtedness, secured by deeds of trust or mortgages
on real property or personal property situated in, upon or appurtenant thereto,
and/or purchasing of or otherwise acquiring existing bonds, notes or other
evidences of indebtedness, deeds of trust or mortgages of or upon such properties, or any interest therein, and the holding of the same, or the endorsing,
selling, assigning, transferring or disposing of the same to another corporation."
(GEa. CoP'. LAW § 18, as amended by N. Y. Laws of 1935, c. 905.)
' Commissioner Alger, op. cit. supra note 5, at 96-101, cites many instances
of improper appraisal practices. For instance, he states: "I found many cases
where an appraiser, being informed of the amount of the loan applied for,
apparently reached his appraisal figure by taking one and one-half times this
amount." And further: "In a market where competition among lenders was
severe, the company which would make the largest loan got the business. The
appraisers were in many cases under constant pressure from their superior
officers urging them not to be too conservative in their appraisals. I believe
that the whole system of company appraisals, in fact the present system generally, requires safeguards not yet provided by law and which must be furnished
if this business is to go on under any form of adequate public regulation."
Recommendation No. 14, at page 164 of his report, contains this important
proposal:
"No mortgage to be guaranteed either as to principal or interest
which exceeds 2/3 of the appraised value of the real estate, or in respect
of which the net annual income (after taxes) of the property for the
calendar year preceding the sale has amounted to less than 1I/2 times the
interest charge of the mortgage or where the annual interest charge
exceeds one-half of one per cent of the then capital and surplus of the
company."
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other institution. As long as competition for loans was
very keen and the money was easy this hope could be
indulged in with some degree of safety, but no provision
was made for the contingency which occurred when the
money market collapsed and loans were not available. The
investor, on the other hand, who bought a bond or a participation in a mortgage was led to believe that at the end of
three years, or five years, as the case may be, his money
would be readily available to him. With the advent of the
depression and the drying up of sources for loans, this assurance necessarily failed to materialize. Finally, without any
fraud or corruption, and with the best of intentions, no institution can lend hundreds of millions of dollars without making numerous mistakes. As a result, many investors found
that their security was of doubtful value. So occurred the
seeming paradox that two investors, who bought participations in mortgages from the same company, and felt the same
faith in the lending institution, discovered to the chagrin of
at least one of them that one investor bought a fairly good
security and the other a very bad one.
These lessons, which have now become clear to all, were
not a secret to informed men of finance. Among the lists of
bondholders and certificate holders which are available, we
find a peculiar and conspicuous absence of the names of
wealthy investors and men of affairs. In the main, the bondholders and certificate holders are small tradesmen, who
have accumulated savings over a long period of time, financial institutions investing trust funds, and philanthropic societies. There is a notable lack of bankers and men of affairs among the hundreds of thousands of certificate holders
and bondholders whose savings went into the financing of
these real estate holdings.
In 1935 the Legislature of the State of New York, in
dealing with this problem, enacted a statute creating an administrative agency and conferring upon it the power to
study the situation with a view to recommending a permanent state policy.10 Almost from the beginning of its studies
MTGE. CoMm. AcT of 1935, § 4, subd. 21 reads:
"The commission may in its discretion initiate and carry on such
studies, investigations and researches as will assist it in recommending
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the Commission's attention was attracted to the tremendous
difference between the course of real estate investments in
the United States and the course that they took in other
countries. Apparently, in no other large country did there
exist such a complete collapse of the real estate mortgage
investments as occurred here.1 1 Elsewhere investors in mortgage securities continued to receive their interest throughout
the depression, and no defaults of any consequence were noted
or were experienced by the public, and this in spite of the
fact that the depression was at least as severe in other countries as here.
It is, of course, difficult to theorize about causes. Account must be taken of conditions in foreign countries which
differ in many respects from those that obtain here in the
field of real estate. The nations of Europe are old. Mortgages are not as common there as they are here. Moreover,
there people live for generations in the same houses and develop considerable personal attachment to their property.
Here we have a mobile population which moves from place
to place within one city and from city to city and state to
state. The desire and the interest in preserving equities in
such temporary dwellings are infinitely less forceful than
those which obtain in the case of an ancestral home. Again,
the construction of new buildings has gone on at a much
faster tempo here than elsewhere. New ideas for apartments,
office buildings, and other structures have been developed
and put into execution here with great rapidity. Experiments
which we have tried have been left untouched in other lands.
These considerations cannot-be overlooked in considering the
causes which led to the collapse of mortgage investments
here.
These differences in circumstances, important though
the enactment of appropriate legislation designed to increase public confidence in real estate and mortgage investments, lessen the burden of
taxation now resting on real property, and provide proper supervision,
regulation and control of the issuance, guaranty, sale and distribution of
mortgage investments."
The default in external Chilean land bank bonds took place because of the
devaluation of Chilean currency. The bank received payment from its debtors
in Chilean money, and had promised to pay in American dollars. Since the
ratio between Chilean pesos and American dollars had changed to the detriment
of the former, it was impossible to pay the external bonds at par.
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they are, will hardly suffice fully to explain the fine record

that mortgage investments have made in foreign countries.
Recognition must be given to the system of governmental
regulations that existed abroad and to the fact that there

the task of distributing mortgage investments was intrusted
almost entirely to mortgage banks. When we contemplate
the essential differences between the methods of operation of

a foreign mortgage bank and an American mortgage company, it would seem a priori that the foreign institutions
were sounder, less subject to the ravages of economic cycles,
more resilient to the needs of the small investor, and more

adequate as a power with which to direct the course of the
development of land values generally.
One important distinction between mortgage banks
abroad and our mortgage companies is the custom there of
making loans only on long term mortgages which are carefully amortized during the life of the loan. 12 We have point' The Cr&lit Foncier may make real estate mortgage loans of two kinds:
(1) those which are self-amortizing in from 10 to 75 years, known as long
term loans; (2) those which may or may not be self-amortizing and which
never exceed 10 years in length, known as short term loans. In France, the
loans most frequently granted in recent years are twenty-year loans (which
must be self-amortizing) for amounts ranging between 10,000 and 50,000 francs.
The balance sheet for the year 1934 of the Credit Foncier shows that at the end
of the year the company had outstanding loans exceeding six billion francs at
long term and about four hundred thirty -million francs at short term.
Similar provisions are to be found in the statutes of other mortgage banks.
See: ENG. AGRIC. CREDIT ACT of 1928, 18 & 19 Geo. V, c. 43, Charter of
Mortgage Bank of Uruguay, art. 43, and GERMAN MTGE. BANK AcT of 1899,

art. 20, as representative of these provisions.
has been a departure from this policy.

In some countries, however, there

Dr. H. H. v. d. Berg of Amsterdam, Netherlands, says of mortgage loans
in his country:
"A cette 6poque (a l'origine) on a sourtout consenti des pr&s,
remboursable par annuit6s, dans l'id~e que ce syst6me 6tait favorable .
l'agriculture. Il est apparu de plus en plus que les propri6taires de biens
ruraux n'appr6ciaient pas ce genre de pr8ts et beaucoup d'entre aux,

apr~s avoir pay6 un certain nombre d'annuit6s, demandaient un changement dans le mode de remboursement. En cons6quence les banques
hypoth6caires n'ont actuellement pr6sque plus de prats remboursables par
annuit6s.
"Les prts sont faits pour une duroe de 5 ou 10 ans, remboursables
soit int6gralement .la fin de la p6riode convenue, soit par des versements

annuels de 2% du capital pr~t&"
Notice sur le credit foncier aux Pays Bas, 1934.

19371]

MORTGAGE BANKS

ed out that here mortgages were made usually from periods
running three to five years with no intention in the world
that the mortgagor should pay off the loan in the limited
period. On the other hand, the Credit Foncier, or any other
leading foreign mortgage bank, would rarely make a loan
for only three years. The loan would average twenty, or
sometimes even thirty years. Substantial amounts would be
paid each year in reduction of the principal. By the time the
loan matured ordinarily nothing would be left of the mortgage. It would be paid off in full and if a balance remained
unpaid it would be so small that it could be easily dealt with.
A mortgage of that kind is a self-liquidating obligation. If it
were prudently made in the first instance in a sum not out of
line with the earning capacities of the property (as the charters of all successful mortgage banks require), both the interest and the amortization can be derived from the income
and all that the mortgagee is required to do to safeguard
his investment is to keep a watchful eye against waste. Such
a mortgage constitutes adequate security for any bond that
might be sold against it and barring totally unforeseen accidents which might occur, the rise and fall of market prices
within the memory of ordinary experiences will not seriously
affect the value of that mortgage even if it be at some time
slightly impaired.
Of course, lending money for a twenty-year period freezes
one's assets for a long time since the lender has the money in
the building and cannot take it out. This is, of course, inevitable. The idea that you can freeze up assets and have
them liquid at the same time is a contradiction not only in
terms but in fact. And the effort to create the appearance
of liquidity by making mortgages short term on paper but
long term in fact is undoubtedly one of the primary producing causes of the ultimate mortgage collapse in this country.
On the other hand, it is not necessary that the individual in-
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vestor should be without remedy against this frozen condition of his investment. When the mortgage is once distributed to the public in the form of bonds, and where there
is a large investing public and a limited supply of mortgages,
the creation of a public market for these bonds will add some
degree of liquidity to the investment. Bond issues of mortgage banks are generally listed on the exchanges. 13 They
are sold daily and bids are made for them on several exchanges at the same time. It is interesting to note that the
fluctuations in the price of the debentures of these mortgage banks has been rather slight and times of depression
have not created havoc with their prices, nor have times of
prosperity sent them flying to the sky. They have been, in
the main, sound, prudent, safe, and non-fluctuating secu4
rities.1
Mortgage bank debentures are listed on the exchanges of: France, Egypt,
Colombia, Argentina, Chile, Germany, Netherlands and many other countries.
"During the years 1926 to 1930 fluctuations in mortgage bank debentures
in the following countries were:

1926

1927

1928

1929

1930

A rgentina ............................

700

523

504

486
48_2

463
420

B razil ....................................

510
326

T15

42_8

530

465

470

Chile ......................................

98.5
94.75

97.25

99.75
5.75

99.75
83.5

99
76

98
O

93
TO

78
71

2040

2175

92

*Colom bia ...........................

542

93
99.5
95.75

2055
1965
2835
D enm ark..............................
100
1790
1800

390

1945

424

1985

E gypt ....................................

76
71Y,

86.25
72.375

82.5
78

84.5
82

86
83.5

F inland ..................................

101
98.75
250

102
99.75
305

102.5
99.5

102
97.75

101.75
93.375

369

384
32_0

425
385

G erm any ..............................

101.5
94

103.625
97.5

101.25
_8

99

98.5
81

Netherlands .........................

100.25
100

100.5
100

100.625
100

101.5
101.0625

F rance ...................................

f15

24_0

2

100.75
100.0625
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But the long term mortgage is not the only characteristic of the mortgage bank in which it differs from our mortgage companies. It seems never to have occurred to anyone
before it was tried here, that the public investment in general mortgages should be augmented by the sale of participations in an individual mortgage, which are then either guaranteed or not, as the case may be. When a particular
mortgage is divided among a group of people the investors
in that particular mortgage will, of course, derive only such
advantages as the mortgage itself produces. Another investor, buying a part interest in another mortgage, may fare
better or worse. Neither has a choice in practice in determining which mortgage he shall buy a part interest in. Usually the advice of the money lending institution is accepted.
This inequality among the security holders of real estate investments has been one of the major difficulties of our unregulated system. One comes across many peculiar cases
where, for example, a father has established two trust funds
-one for his daughter and one for his son-and the one trust
fund is valueless and the other is perfectly all right, merely
because he has put certificates of one mortgage into one trust
CREDIT FoNcmR
MORTGAG

Quotations

BOiDS

Issued Rate

Par

1928

1931

1932 1933

1934

1935

425 360
36-3

364

334

360.50

351

960

858

1929

1930

1903

3's

500

369 385 425 463
30----2-0 38-5 40-

1913

3Y2's

500

375
50-0

1929

5's

1930

48's 1000

1000

394
331

440 497 426 362
W7 40-0 S7--0
1005
1031
1040
1028 890
j
T002 _97 T000
960
997 1020
8
8

967
8

791

842

785

599
621 537
5'75

521

527

505

959 765
g
845
978 810
8-5

795

747

844

789

COMMUNAL

1927

1f7
7''

1930

4's

598
540
7_5 3513

597
5_62

980 1000
9532926
1912 s986
1931-2_64'

6-
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fund and certificates of another in the other trust fund. It
is difficult to explain this to the investor, who repeatedly
complains: "I bought these certificates at the same time, from
the same company, through the same person, and paid for
them with the same kind of money. Why is this better than
that?" Mortgage banks never experienced such difficulty because the debentures issued by a mortgage bank are not part
interests in any one mortgage, but are the general obligations
of the mortgage bank and all of the mortgages held by the
bank stand behind all of the obligations of the bank. When
an investor buys a bond of a mortgage bank he knows that
the whole portfolio of the bank's investments stand behind
his bond, and that if mistakes have been made in a few cases
they will not seriously impair his security. There will still
be the rest of the assets in the bank to fall back on if need be.
This, of course, presents a very different picture from
that which was produced by the mortgage guaranty companies, who distributed billions of dollars of part interests
in individual mortgages to hundreds of thousands of unwary
investors.
The matter of the appraisal of real property is also differently regulated in countries where mortgage banks prevail
than it has been here. We need not recite examples of fraudulent appraisals made in the offices of guaranty companies
in the past, but merely refer to the haphazard nature of these
appraisals and to the difficulty of determining what constitutes an adequate appraisal. 15 Again this is one of those
problems the solution of which is extremely difficult. The
difficulty arises from the fact that the value of any real property, that is, its market value, is a function of the economic
level in which a particular community finds itself. Market
value, by definition, equals the amount of money that an article will bring when offered for sale in the market. It presupposes the existence of the market more or less active. It
assumes that there is a buyer ready, willing and able to buy
almost everything that is offered for sale. Of course, in times
of deep depression the market itself disappears. There are
no buyers. Even as a depression recedes the extent to which
See note 9, stpra.
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the market develops depends upon the extent of the recovery.
Moreover, different types of real property are affected differently by the nature of the recovery. If the working man
becomes prosperous, that is, if employment returns and real
wages rise, one type of real property becomes saleable. On
the other hand, middle class prosperity, which may exist
without the rise of real wages, affects the value of a wholly
different type of structure.
These difficulties present problems for experts to determine. The valuation of real property must be fixed at some
point if financing through mortgages is to continue and this
valuation must take into account the cycles of economic prosperity and depression, so far as they are predictable by the
human mind, and the ultimate value of the real property
must be expressed in terms of its income producing probabilities. Obviously, not every man who has been a broker and
arranged the sale of real estate, or who has bought and sold
an estate himself, or has built a house, or has bought a lot,
is qualified to make these judgments. Appraisals, if they are
to be relied upon at all must be made by a professional class
of men trained in the consideration of the elements of value.
Such a professional class can only be created by regulatory
measures enacted by the Legislature putting educational requirements behind the license to act as an appraiser and forbidding mortgage banks to lend money except upon the basis
of an appraisal made by a duly licensed appraiser. In some
countries these appraisers are civil servants. Elsewhere they
are chartered like accountants or lawyers.18 Here every one
who pays the fee for getting a broker's license and desires
to do so may call himself an appraiser and render opinions
which may be relied on under the law by financial institutions, as to the value of real property. Small wonder we
have found that in many cases the appraisals which the
companies relied on were far in excess of any sensible no" The report of the Joint Legislative Committee to investigate the guaranteed mortgage situation (LEG. Doc. No. 79, 1936) states: "In California appraisers are licensed by the state, and may be removed by a state officer. A similar
system should be adopted here." In England, every person who acts as an
appraiser must take out an annual license. If he fails to do so he may be fined
and cannot recover for his services. APPRAISERS LiCENSES AcT of 1806, 46
Geo. III, c. 43.
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tion of the value of the property. More often the appraiser
governed himself by what he knew to be the amount of the
application for the loan. If the borrower wished $100,000,
then the appraiser found no difficulty in estimating the value
of the property at $140,000. In this way, the law was satisfled, the loan was made, the bonds or certificates sold, and
the foundation laid for the troubles which were thereafter
experienced.
Coincident, therefore, with the adoption of any program
for the creation of mortgage banks must follow an enactment
of a well considered regulatory measure which will prescribe
educational and experience qualifications for the profession
of appraisers and which will forbid banks and other institutions to lend money on real property except on the basis
of an appraisal duly made by a duly licensed appraiser.
The money which mortgage banks use to lend to the
mortgagors comes from the public sale of the debentures of
the bank. These debentures, as already indicated, are the
firm obligation of the mortgage bank and behind them stand
all the assets of the institution. Because mortgage banks
are conservatively operated, these debentures are high grade
investments. They are listed on the exchanges and they sell
very close to par with but small fluctuations." The advantage of liquidity and safety renders the investments and the
securities of the mortgage bank available for the portfolios
of those who wish to put aside their savings to provide for
future needs. The interest rates which mortgage banks are
compelled to pay on these debentures are, therefore, comparatively low.' More frequently the interest rates of mort'See note 14, supra.
'SThe interest rates paid by the Credit Foncier on its debenture issues from
1879 to 1934 are shown below. The comparatively high rates paid from 1917
onward would seem to be the results of an internal condition peculiar to France
and these interest rates would not be translated to this country. The size of the
issue in millions of francs is also noted. A feature of the French bank's
debentures is that they are callable for repayment by means of drawing lots.
Each call includes the number of debentures necessary to effect an amortization
so that the debentures outstanding never exceed the capital remaining due on
the mortgage loans. It is also noteworthy that the issues of 1917 and 1921,
which were issued at comparatively higher interest rates than the preceding
issues, had been entirely retired by 1931 after an issue of two billion francs at
a lower rate permitted a refunding operation. The interest rate on mortgage
loans by the bank (upon which data is available) shows that mortgage loans by
the bank in 1921 produced 8Y4%; in 1922, 7.69o; in 1924, 8%; in 1925, 89o;
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gage bank securities are very close to those paid by the government itself and, in the case of some governments, the
debentures of the mortgage banks sell at a lower rate of interest than that of their own governments. 19 In this country
it was almost conventional for a mortgage loan to carry an interest rate of 6%o and for the certificate or bond to carry an
interest rate of 51/%. This was true even though the best
securities and the highest grade bonds were only carrying
interest at 3% or 3 %. Obviously, there is something wrong
here when gilt-edge securities can bring only 3 % and senior
mortgage securities can. bring 5 %. Nevertheless, the investor was given the impression that these senior mortgage
loans were unique investments in which the high interest rate
was paid in spite of maximum safety. It is illogical, in a
period of declining interest rates, that securities which are
really safe should carry an interest rate so high as 5 %.
At the present time it is perfectly possible, presumably, to
market mortgage bank debentures under a system of mortin 1926, 8%; in 1928, 8.2%; in 1929, 7.15%; in 1931, 6.25%; in 1932, 6.5%;
in 1933, 7.5%; in 1934, 8.05%. By law there is established a differential of
6/10 of 1% between interest received on mortgage loans and interest paid on
mortgage debentures. The apparent excess of differential is accounted for by
taxes and other out-of-pocket expenses to which the transactions are subject

under French law.
Debentures

Size of Issue
(Millions of francs)

1879
1883
1885
1895
1903
1909

3%
3%
2.6%
2.8%
3%
3%

1913

4%

1913

1917

1921
1926
1929
1930
1932
1933
1934

31/%

900
900
500
250
300
350

500

150

552%

300

62%
7%
5%
4r2%
4Y2%
5%.
53/%

300
500
300
2000
200
500
200

"0Limited information on this subject shows that in 1928, in Germany, the
comparative prices of mortgage bank and government bonds were as follows:
M ortgages ....................................................................
90.22
Mortgages (Public banks) ....................................
89.19
Government ..............................
88.32
DR. G. PLUm, DAs HYPOTHEKENBANKJAHR (1928).
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gage banks properly authorized with all necessary safeguards
at rates considerably less than 5/2%. It has been variously
estimated that these mortgage bank debentures could be sold
anywhere from 3% to 4/2%o, depending on the quantity and
the extent of the issue. Mortgage lending itself should not
go into the rut of a fixed rate of interest regardless of what
the money market is commanding at a particular time. The
idea that a mortgagor must pay 6% interest on mortgage
money regardless of what the conditions are in the field of
finance is without foundation in logic, and it is unsound
from an economic point of view. There are times when loans
on mortgages must be made at higher rates of interest and
there are other times when they may be made at lower rates
of interest. Mortgage banks scientifically organized must
study the situation and they are entitled to receive fair compensation for the service they thus render, to wit, the distribution of the bonds to the investing public and the investment of the proceeds in satisfactory mortgage loans. This
compensation ought never to exceed a differential of 1%, at
the most, between the amount received from the mortgagor
and the amount paid to the security holder. Our estimates
show that with such a differential of 1% a very adequate and
satisfactory profit can be earned by the entrepreneurs of the
20
mortgage bank.

Money borrowing institutions did not suffer in the depression because the principal amount of their loans were
called. Even in bad times there were places (and the last
resort was always the Government), where loans could be obtained by financial institutions to meet pressing obligations
'A differential of one per cent between income received on mortgage loans
and interest paid on mortgage debentures will be expended: one-half of one
per cent on cost of operation, one-half of one per cent on profit and reserves.
The full disbursement of one-half of one per cent to stockholders would show
a return to stockholders (assuming capacity holdings of mortgages and capacity
issuance of debentures and allowing a three per cent investment income for
liquid surplus) as follows:

Ratio of Debentures to Capital
10 to 1

15 to 1

20 to 1

25 to 1

30 to 1

Return to Stockholders
9Y2%

12%

14112%

17%

19Y%
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to return the principal amount due to their investors. What
created the serious problem for the money borrowing institutions was the obligation to pay a fixed rate of interest
higher than they could earn. This sort of fixed obligation
renders difficult of achievement whatever chance which the
institution may have of working out even a temporary embarrassment. When an institution must pay 51% and can
only collect 3%, obviously a condition exists which cannot
be made the basis of sound governmental aid. Such at
least was the attitude of financial experts during the last
depression.
The most spectacular illustration of this attitude is the
difference between the experiences of our mutual savings
banks and those of our mortgage companies. The mutual
savings banks, in the main, weathered the storm quite
happily, and they did so in spite of the fact that all of their
deposits were constantly on call. Here and there a savings
bank found itself in a position where its depositors demanded
their money. The neighboring institutions supplied it with
money and the depositor was satisfied until confidence
was restored again. What saved them was the fact that
through the operation of the law they were able to reduce
their interest requirements from 4% to 3 % to 3% to
22%7, and finally, to 2%, so that at no time was it necessary
for any of these mutual savings banks to operate on a basis
where its expenses exceeded its income. The securities they
held were industrial bonds and real estate mortgages, but
they were able to reduce their obligations and thus to continue to live. Mortgage companies, on the other hand, were
unable to reduce their obligations and when interest payments became due and the money was not forthcoming with
which to pay them, it was pointless for them to borrow because they would only put in good money to pull out bad.
The longer they stayed in business the greater the deficit and
the more money they needed, and so the mortgage companies
had to collapse while the mutual savings bank continued to
exist without too much difficulty. This lesson is one which
must not be ignored and which, taken to heart, leads inevitably to the conclusion that mortgage banks, if they are to
succeed and to remain permanently whole, must be in a posi-
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tion to permit the interest rate which it pays on the debentures to fluctuate with the income produced by the collateral
which it holds. In the long run, investors are better served
by an institution which can continue to pay even 1%, or
of 1%, on the investment than by an institution which obligates itself through all seasons, in all sorts of financial
weather, to pay 5 % and then collapses in the attempt to
fulfill its obligation.
The capital structure of mortgage banks is to be established on a sounder basis than was the capital structure of
the old mortgage companies. It would seem to be self-evident
that those who wish to engage in the business of distributing
real estate securities among the public should at least invest
a substantial sum of money in the undertaking to assure the
financial stability of their companies. The mortgage bank
must, therefore, be required to have a minimum capital which
some of us have thought should be not less than $5,000,000;
others have been satisfied with only $3,000,000. In addition
a paid-in surplus should be required of the stockholders of
the mortgage bank at least equal to the amount of the capital.
Many have thought that a percentage of the profits of the
mortgage bank should be set aside as a reserve fund to meet
contingencies as they occur. Others have been of the opinion
that this is an unnecessary drain on the institution. Whatever may be the ultimate conclusion with regard to these
matters, it is, of course, obvious that the larger the permanent
financial resources of the bank are the easier it will be to
meet contingencies if a general collapse should occur. And
again, the requirement that the capital and surplus should be
a substantial one will make it difficult for small companies
to come into existence with means that are inadequate to
meet even temporary reverses.
An important feature of the mortgage bank legislation
is the limitation of the total amount of debentures which
any mortgage bank may issue to a specified ratio of the capital and surplus of the bank. The bills which were introduced into the Legislature of the State of New York variously fixed this ratio at fifteen or twenty times the capital. 2 1
'.S.

PR.

INT.

(1936) No. 1080, PL 1215, 1648, 1810; S.

1240, 1450, Ass.

PR.

3238.

INT.

(1937)

No. 1104,
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Theoretically, it is not necessary to limit the amount of debentures that a mortgage bank may sell if we assume, as we
must, that the mortgage bank will be prudently managed and
the investments conservatively made. Then it does not matter how many debentures are sold as long as they do not exceed the mortgages held in the portfolio of the bank. Practically, however, it seems wise to limit the amount of the debentures that a bank may issue to a fixed proportion of its
capital. In other countries this ratio has varied enormously.
In some countries the amount of the debentures that may
be sold is as low as ten times its capital. 22 On the other
hand, in one mortgage bank it is as high as fifty times its
capital. 2 3 We believe that at least to begin with, it might
prove a wise policy to limit the total debentures that may
be sold by a mortgage bank to twenty times its capital, permitting the Legislature to expand this ratio if at some future
time it seems advisable and safe to do so.
The best laid plans for the regulation of financial institutions will, of course, be utterly futile unless the institutions are manned by honest and efficient directors. We cannot legislate honesty and efficiency into men. These things
are the heritage of individuals and not the gifts of the state.
Nevertheless, while we cannot insure, we can frequently advance honesty and efficiency. A watchful eye over the affairs of the mortgage bank must ever be kept by the regulatory body duly empowered and enabled to do so by the
A partial list of these ratios, as contained in Legislative Document No.
63 of 1936, shows that mortgage banks in the following countries maintain a
ratio of outstanding debentures to capital at 10 to 1 as follows:
Bank
Country
Credit Foncier du Brezil
Brazil
Banco hipotecario de Minas Geraes
Mortgage Bank of Bogota
Colombia

Mun Mortgage Bank
Finland
Town Mortgage Bank of Kingdom of Sweden
Sweden
= Credit Foncier de France. It should be noted in this connection, however,
that of the eighteen billion francs of loans in the portfolio of this bank in 1934,
eleven billion francs were invested in loans to municipalities, to repay which
the taxing power of the municipal government was pledged. The. safety of
the municipal loans may be judged by the fact that only one million francs were
in arrears on February 28, 1935, or one franc in each eleven hundred loaned.
Of nearly seven billion francs on real estate mortgage loans outstanding at the
end of 1934, the arrears on February 28, 1935 totalled one hundred twenty-five
million francs, or less than 2%.
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state. Frequent reports by the bank to the Superintendent
of Banks, frequent examinations by the superintendent of
the affairs of the bank, are inevitable and indispensable, both
to the creation of confidence in the public in the institution,
which is necessary, and to the smooth functioning of its
policies.2 4 Reports alone, however, filed in the office of the
superintendent are not enough. Publicity-pitiless publicity
-is vital, and the kind of publicity which the common man
can understand and which does not require learning and experience to interpret must be made available. Mortgage
banks should be required to publish financial statements at
least twice a year, not only in financial papers but in daily
newspapers. Data should be available at the superintendent's office where, upon request, any proposed investor can
obtain information about the bank. Publicity should be given
by the superintendent to the fact that such data is available.
This data should be in form prescribed by law so that he
who runs may read, and he who reads may understand.
Here, as elsewhere, experience teaches that the secret of
democracy is best guarded by knowledge of the truth and
that secret financial transactions, like secret diplomacy and
secret governmental councils, lead to the ultimate disruption
of the democratic processes in business as well as in government.
Drafting legislation to put into effect some of the recommendations which we make has been a most difficult task.
It is, of course, not difficult to put down in words and phrases
the regulations which have been suggested in this paper.
The difficulty is in getting unanimity of opinion among the
experts about the particular form which these recommendations should take in the statutes. We have been met with
a number of propositions which, in some cases, are difficult
to deal with.
In the first place, it has been stated by some that there
is already too much government regulation in business, and
2 Section 42 of the Banking Law now requires quarterly reports from
every institution under the jurisdiction of the Superintendent of Banks.
Section 44 of the Insurance Law requires annual reports from every corporation or other insurer under the jurisdiction of the Superintendent of
Insurance.
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that the directors of a bank ought to be given a free hand to
carry out the policies as they see fit. After all (it is said), one
cannot depend on the Superintendent of Banks to know as
much about business as the experts who invest their money in
the banking institution. They, above all, know more and understand more than government officials could possibly hope
to, and, accordingly, the statute ought to be drafted in order
to give the widest discretion to the bank management. This
sounds so much like an echo of the laissez-faire economics
that it is difficult to deal with. Most of us were content
with the thought that such economics were decently interred
on the 4th of March, 1933, but it seems not to be able to stay
within the confines of the sepulchre. Every now and then it
shows itself again with a distrust of government regulation
and a desire to restore unrestrained liberty of action to bank
directors and entrepreneurs generally. The history of the
last two decades should have proved that unbridled freedom
is infinitely more undesirable than the occasional errors
which might have come from regulation. And, of course,
regulation should be tempered to meet the need for it. Where
there is no need for the regulation, it is, of course, futile and
wasteful to have it. The losses sustained by the American
public in the field of real estate securities seem to us to justify a strong measure of regulatory supervision in the
future.2 5
In the second place, we are asked, if the business of
selling real estate securities is to be so carefully guarded by
the state as to be entrusted only to mortgage banks under
careful supervision of the state government, what about the
business of selling other securities? Why should investors
in other securities be left to the mercy of high pressure
salesmen while investors in real estate securities are carefully protected by state laws? The objection has been urged
most strongly in connection with the proposal to limit the
A typical case is that of American Bond and Mortgage Company, Inc.
(Chicago). Its bonded debt, unsecured, amounted to $4,860,000. Defaults in
interest began on the 1st of March, 1930. Subsequently it was petitioned in
bankruptcy and a 10% dividend was paid in cash and the balance in notes, of
which 5% has been paid. In addition to the foregoing, they also underwrote the
payment of twenty-one issues of mortgages amounting to $18,799,020, all of
which were in default.
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sale of real estate securities to mortgage banks. The proponents of the mortgage bank idea have naturally felt that
real estate securities should not be permitted to be sold by
any other group. Because of the restrictions placed on mortgage banks it was deemed inadvisable to permit non-regulated
companies to compete with them. Monopoly for the sale of
real estate securities would exist in a sense. This is the situation in countries where mortgage banks are in existence and
have prospered. 26 However, we are told that this sounds like
class legislation in that it discriminates unfairly in favor of
the purchaser of real estate investments. The objection
sounds technical in that the words "class legislation" impart
a flavor of unconstitutionality. Constitutional lawyers, however, have not generally feared that the classification is an
unreasonable one. Nor can it be argued logically that a
statute which attempts to do some good should not be enacted
simply because it does not do more good. All reforms in the
past have been piecemeal and it is perfectly pbssible that the
regulation of real estate securities is a beginning toward the
general approach to the regulation of all securities. Whether
this be so or not seems to be beside the question, for the problem we have set ourselves to solve is the problem involved in
the distribution of real estate securities. Other problems
must bide their time and be the subject for solution for those
who are particularly qualified to deal with them.,
In the third place, we have been urged to consider that
mortgage banks and the program under which they are to
operate would put a definite brake upon the construction of
new buildings and the development of the real estate industry generally. Mortgage money would become more conservative and financing of real estate would require larger contributions of capital by the owners of the venture. There
are those who think that this is an objection to the plan.
Others think it is an advantage. We do not believe that it
is either an objection or an advantage; we are of the opinion
that the consequence foretold will not occur. In spite of the
conservative approach which mortgage banks will undoubtA monopolistic mortgage bank exists in Sweden and did until recently
exist in Spain. A de facto monopoly exists in France.
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edly have, and in spite of the fact that mortgages will be
smaller in relation to the cost and value of the property than
they have been in the past, it will not be necessary for owners
to invest larger sums of capital than they heretofore have.
Many will do so, others will take advantage of junior financing, which used to flourish even in the good old days and
which will now be able to exist on a more prudent basis.
The difficulty in the past has been that junior financing has
been totally unscientific and that in many cases there was
no real justification for it after the first mortgage had been
placed. With more conservative first mortgages there will
be an adequate opportunity for junior financing from which
legitimate profits can be gained by investors, and which will
go far toward paying adequate returns on real property to
real property investors.
Finally, we have been told that the whole scheme of authorizing mortgage banks in the United States is unconstitutional, contrary to the traditions of America, a foreign importation, and something with which we ought to have nothing to do. We state this objection not because we hope persuasively to refute it, but because it has been made so often.
To refute it is impossible. The late Mr. Justice Holmes told
about the knight of old who was accustomed to point to his
lady fair and if you did not agree that she was the most beautiful in the world you had to fightY. So it is with those who
object to reform measures on the ground that they are foreign or out of line with some supposed tradition and frequently that they are unconstitutional. This argument is
the refuge of an opponent who will not reason but who reacts
emotionally, or perhaps for some ulterior motive, to a proposed suggestion for reform. With such as these it is futile
to engage in further polemic. We must simply submit our
case to the board of public opinion, where we who still have
faith in democracy believe reasoned judgments will ultimately prevail.
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